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INTRODUCTION 
The literature on global warming has been expanding 
rapidly over the last five years. Yet, little attention has 
been paid to the implications of going beyond a doubling of 
carbon dioxide. Concentrating our attention on the double CO, 
scenario shows a limited understanding of the available 
scientific information on global warming and a lack of concern 
for the future. In fact this suggests a time horizon of a 
around 30 years; as 2025 is the date by which such a doubling 
is to be expected according to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. 
Such a position should not surprise economists who are 
used to invoking discount rates of 10% and calculating net 
present values. The point of view is only reinforced by the 
creation of an intergenerational externality which result in 
the asymmetry of costs and benefits; that is the imposition of 
costs and risks on the unborn. However, the implications of 
acting in this way are extremely serious for future 
generations. In addition, the results imply a particularly 
undesirable moral stance. 
In this paper the long term picture of global climate 
change is painted. The result is argued to be in favour of 
inaction on the part of the current generation if 'suitable' 
discount rates are chosen. This choice is then seen as a moral 
decision which requires justification . Four possible arguments 
in favour of discounting are presented and criticised. This 
leaves an indeterminate concern over the well being of future 
individuals which is inadequately expressed under the cost-
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benefit approach to global warming (Nordhaus, May and July 
1991; Ayres and Walter, 1991). More importantly, the arguments 
for ignoring responsibilities for the future effects of global 
warming are shown to reveal a fundamental flaw in economic 
reasoning. Harm cannot be handled in the same way as good, and 
the deliberate imposition of harm on the defenceless is 
immoral. As a result an obligation for the control of global 
warming is argued to exist . 
The next section investigates the physical impacts of the 
greenhouse effect with some suggested economic implications. 
This is followed by a brief outline of the arguements 
concernng the existence of obligations to future generations. 
As a result of accepting some obligations their general nature 
is argued to derive from two seperate concerns: equity and 
injury. This latter concern is then considered as a cause for 
compensation. However, the extent to which compensation can be 
regarded as adequate, in a moral sense, recompense for 
deliberately inflicted harm is questioned. As a result some 
of the issues surrounding a the rights of future generations 
are raised. 
INTERTEMPORAL IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING 
Mean global temperature has in the past been much warmer 
than at present; l aC during the Holocene climatic optimum (5000 
to 6000 years ago), 2°C higher during the last interglacial 
warming (125,000 years ago), and 3°C to 4°C higher during the 
Pliocene (3 to 4 million years ago) (MacDonald, 1988). 
However, over the last 10,000 years, from the Holocene to the 
Little Ice Age, the mean temperature of the northern 
hemisphere varied by no more than about 2°C (Gates, 1983). 
Given a mean global temperature, in recent years, of 
approximately 15°C the variation since the Holocene has been 
less than 14 percent. 
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The earth's mean surface temperature has increased 
between O.soC and 0.7°C, or 3 to S percent, since 1860 
(Abrahamson 1989 p.10), coinciding with the increased 
combustion of fossil fuels due to industrialisation. Hansen et 
al. (1986) predict the warming of most mid-latitude northern 
hemisphere land areas at between O.SOC to 1.0°C by 1990-2000, 
and 1°C to 2°C by 2010-2020. The evidence from more than 100 
independent studies gives estimates of average global warming 
within the 1.Soc to 4.SoC range (up to a 30 percent increase) 
for a double carbon dioxide scenario (Jamieson, 1988). Such a 
doubling is expected sometime in the next century. Thus, 
global warming due to the release of greenhouse gases 
represents a potentially drastic temperature increase over a 
relatively short period of time. 
Yet, there appears to be a time during which aggregate 
benefits from greenhouse gas emissions dominate costs. Most 
obviously, society benefits from the relatively cheap use of 
fossil fuels, but there are other benefits as well. An 
average global warming of O.SOC is expected to produce net 
benefits in terms of heating, agriculture, and water use 
(d'Arge et al., 1975) . Research suggests that Great Lakes fish 
may benefit; with Walleye yields in Lake Michigan increasing 
29-33%, although trout may simultaneously decrease by 2-6% 
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(Mlot 1989). Idso (1983) maintains that increased levels of 
atmospheric CO, will increase future well-being via crop 
fertilization. This is achieved if escalated CO, concentrations 
enhance crop productivity, by increasing rates of 
photosynthesis, and reduce water use, by decreasing rates of 
transpiration. The projected yield increases range from 16%, 
for corn, to 60%, for cotton, under a CO, doubling (Seneft, 
1990). In the past an argument has been put forward in favour 
of deliberately increasing mean global temperature to reap the 
benefits of delayed glaciation and increased agricultural 
range (Callendar 1938, p.236). More recently, a similar line 
of reasoning can be found in Crosson (1989) where the costs of 
stopping warming are to be weighed against the potential loss 
from doing so too soon. 
Such benefits are often ignored and would of themselves 
imply serious economic impacts, e.g., on world trade. However, 
as temperature increases benefits are likely to diminish. The 
positive CO, -fertilization effect will only prove beneficial 
while CO, remains a dominant gas in climate forcing. As other 
gases become relatively more important, this benefit will 
diminish while negative impacts of global warming on crop 
yields increase. Agriculture and, particularly, forestry are 
more susceptible to serious declines if climate change occurs 
rapidly. For example, in North America each 1°C rise in 
temperature translates into a range shift of about 100 to 150 
kilometres (Roberts, 1989). The rate of northward dispersal of 
trees due to historical warming, shown by fossil records is 10 
to 45 kilometres a century, with Spruce the fastest at 200 
kilometres. Abrahamson (1989) estimates, given current gas 
emissions, global warming is proceeding at between O.lSoC and 
O.soC per decade. Thus, almost all forest species in North 
America will expand into colder northern climates at slower 
rates than their current range becomes uninhabitable. A 
similar problem may exist for agriculture, but no thorough 
analysis of adaptive capacity has yet been conducted for the 
agricultural sector (Parry, 1990). 
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Costs will also escalate as the ability to adapt is 
restricted by the absolute size and increasing ~ of sea 
level rise. Studies suggest the rate of change of sea level 
will be relatively small in the first quarter of the next 
century compared to the last quarter, and this is true for a 
variety of underlying emissions scenarios (Titus 1989). The 
absolute rise is estimated at between two thirds of a meter to 
over three and a half meters by 2100 (Thomas 1986, Titus 1986, 
Titus 1989). Cost estimates for protecting against a one meter 
rise include $4.4 billion for the Netherlands (Goemans, 1986), 
and up to $100 billion for the east coast of the United States 
(Jaeger, 1989). Broadus (1986) provides an indication of the 
damages to unprotected nations from a one meter rise. These 
include the loss of around one tenth of the land area in both 
Bangladesh and Egypt. resulting in the dislocation of over 16 
million people. Meanwhile. other expectations are that low 
lying islands. such as the Maldives. would disappear 
completely. 
The intertemporal asymmetry of impacts is apparent as 
initial benefits to most regions. from slight global warming, 
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turn into very large economic costs, as warming continues. 
population migration will undoubtedly occur as land is lost to 
rising seas and storm surges, and agricultural productivity is 
reduced in semi-arid regions. The more extreme and rapid the 
temperature increases the greater are the costs and the fewer 
are the benefits . Thus, not only will the damages of preceding 
generations' greenhouse gas releases be placed upon those in 
the distant future, but the cost of continuing to release 
those gases will escalate (d'Arge and Spash, 1991). 
The majority of evidenc e concerning global warming 
limits itself to a double CO, scenario, and ignores what 
happens beyond that point. There is, as Crosson (1989) has 
noted, no reason to believe global warming will stop there. 
Some research has been carried out concerning what happens 
next. Past greenhouse gas emissions have created a stock in 
the atmosphere making some global warming irreversible. The 
lifetime of CO, in the atmosphere, biosphere, and upper ocean 
combined is approximately 500 years (Wuebbles, Grant, Connell 
and Penner, 1989). Emissions of greenhouse gases prior to 1985 
have already committed the earth to a warming of 0.9°C to 
2 . 4°C, of which about o.soc has been experienced . The warming 
yet to be experienced is unrealized warming, 0.3°C to 1.9°C, 
and is unavoidable (Ciborowski, 1989). Emissions of the 
principal greenhouse gases are increasing at rates between 0.3 
and 5 percent per year (Wuebbles, Grant, Connell and Penner, 
1989). Within 50 years we are likely to create an irreversible 
increase of I.S0C to 5°C, and in the 40 years following that a 
further I.SoC to 5°C increase (Ciborowski, 1989). As Cline 
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(1991) reports, a sixfold increase in CO2 has been estimated by 
2250 and an eightfold increase by 2275 associated with central 
estimates of 7.5°C and 10°C respectively. Beyond this point the 
role of ocean uptake is hoped to be our saviour with CO2 
levelling out at 3.5 times preindustrial levels in 750 years 
time (given that the system i s not chaotic). The implication 
is of continually rising temperatures and associated damages 
for at least the next 250 years followed by 500 years of 
stabilization. 
RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 
The previous section has suggested how the greenhouse 
effect could have serious impacts upon future generations 
while actually benefiting their predecessors. Economic 
decisions over what action, if any, to take concerning such 
intergenerational issues are essentially controlled by the 
social discount rate. Economists via their choice of discount 
rate are implicitly attributing different intertemporal 
weights to welfare. 
The standard application of cost-benefit analysis to the 
greenhouse effect, even if all costs and benefits could be 
calculated, would give the impression tha t the future is 
almost valueless. As Nordhaus (July 1991 p.936) has stated, 
The efficient degree of control of GHGs would be 
essentially zero in the case of high costs, low damages, 
and high discounting; by contrast, in the case of no 
discounting and high damages, the efficient degree of 
control is close to one-third of GHG emissions. 
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The distribution of net costs in the future, and net benefits 
now, makes the emission of greenhouse gases appear falsely 
attractive. The process of discounting the future, at almost 
any positive rate, creates insignificant present values for 
even catastrophic losses in the further future. Quirk and 
Terasawa (1991) have recently argued in favour of a government 
discount rate of 10 percent or more. A 10 percent discount 
rate results in benefits and costs occurring in 50 years time 
to be weighted at less than 1 percent. That is, future values 
asymptotically tend to zero relatively quickly.' 
The acceptance of discounting as the proper approach to 
intertemporal distribution requires an unavoidable moral 
judgement (Page 1977). Thus, strong supporters of discounting 
must have strong moral justifications for doing so. The 
rationale for discounting is that individuals express a 
positive time preference and capital is productive (Pearce, 
1983) . That is, both consumers, via a positive rate of time 
preference, and producers, via the social opportunity cost of 
capital, are observed to treat the future as less important 
than the present. Much debate then concerns the appropriate 
rate to chose, and the relationship between private and social 
time preference rates. The determination of a single rate is 
not of concern in this paper, but rather the underlying 
justification for the use of any particular rate (positive, 
zero, or negative). 2 
In general there are four reasons which could be 
advanced to justify giving less weight to the expected future 
damages of global warming than if they were to occur now.) 
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These concern who constitutes the electorate, uncertainty over 
future preferences, the extinction of the human race, and 
uncertainty over future events. Each is explained below along 
with some counter arguments. 
First, taking into account the benefits to unborn 
generations of greenhouse gas abatement may be considered to 
widen the concept of democratic voting in an unacceptable way. 
That is, those who are alive today constitute the proper 
electorate and the government's social welfare function should 
reflect only the preferences of present individuals (Marglin 
1963). An altruistic counter argument can be made in as far as 
individuals identify with a community extending over time. In 
this way posterity gains a voice and a kind of vote due to the 
influence of this voice on actual votes (Boulding, 1966 
p.260). This vote while perhaps extending the concept of 
democracy is still quite limited.' A further extension is to 
accept certain rights for future individuals (discussed 
further below). The problem with ignoring future voters is 
that policy decisions are encouraged which impose costs upon 
them to benefit the present and may later have to be reversed. 
For instance, the construction of Hetch Hetchy dam adjacent to 
Yosemite valley, in California. flooded an area which is now 
highly valued in its former pristine state. In this case 
strong representations are being made to have the dam removed 
and attempt restoration. Unfortunately, once greenhouse gases 
are emitted they are almost entirely beyond our control, i.e. 
the action is irreversible (Spash and d'Arge, 1989). 
If the vote of future generations over greenhouse gas 
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control is to be included, in some manner, the argument can be 
advanced that this is impossible since future preferences are 
unknown. This second argument claims that no coherent sense 
can be given to making persons better or worse off if the 
specific persons are not the same ex ante and ex post. This 
argument relies upon the assumption that all rights come from 
individuals and therefore the identity of individuals is 
central to their rights. Individuals cannot claim they have 
been harmed by global warming if they would otherwise not have 
existed. 
However, we can recognise certain actions will harm 
future persons despite indeterminacy concerning their 
identities and our ignorance of their special needs. Whoever 
exists can reasonably be expected to have the same biological 
needs as those now existing. Regardless of who exists they 
will be better off without a rapidly warming and increasingly 
unstable climate. As Baier (1984) has argued the wrongs we can 
do a future person are usually restricted to injuries fixed 
before the identity of future persons are fixed. For example 
the destruction of the Maldavian's homeland and the 
dislocation of millions of people in Egypt and Bangladesh 
might qualify as such wrongs. 
The third attempt at justifying intertemporal 
discrimination relies upon the inevitable extinction of the 
human race, for example see Heal (1986). As the human race 
will no longer exist the degradation due to global warming can 
be dismissed or at least discounted. Resources used for 
greenhouse gas control are then better used for increased 
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consumption for the immediate generation. However, the basis 
for such a policy is unclear, and has been countered by the 
ideas of the spaceship earth literature, where compensation of 
the future for increased degradation is required. Furthermore, 
this approach in the case of global warming is in line with a 
self-fulfilling expectation. 
The fourth argument has some points in common with the 
extinction argument. In this case the uncertainty over the 
impacts of global warming are such that there is a probability 
no damages will occur and this probability might be increasing 
overtime. On moral grounds, this ' is equivalent to arguing that 
undertaking actions which can harm others is justified because 
there is a chance they will remain unharmed (Routley and 
Routley 1980). My loosening the wheels on your car is 
acceptable because you might not crash as a result. From an 
economic perspective, the argument means that when deciding to 
undertake an emissions abatement project the future should be 
discounted at some positive rate to account for the risks when 
calculating the present value of the investment. However, 
except under special circumstances, there is no well-defined 
way to adjust the discount rate such that it will make the 
appropriate adjustment for risk in the present value of 
uncertain future benefits and costs in each period. This is 
explained at length, in the context of energy related 
projects, by Lind (1982). 
In addition, Fisher (1981) has shown how the type of 
uncertainty under consideration can result in either increased 
or decreased depletion rates for non-renewable resources. That 
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is, uncertainty can result in resources being preserved for 
the future rather than depleted faster. Thus, where 
assimilative capacity is being depleted, with uncertainty as 
to the stock, risk aversion would argue in favour of reducing 
the rate of depletion, eg, reducing the rate at which carbon 
dioxide is released and atmospheric capacity is mined. 
None of the four justifications seem particularly valid 
or enlightening. They all appear to be, more or less, fall-
back positions, and weak moral grounds from which to defend 
intergenerational discrimination in the form of discounting. 
Interestingly enough, only at the extreme of an infinite 
discount rate would no consideration be given to the future 
effects of greenhouse gas emissions. Cost-benefit analysis as 
commonly applied would use an arbitrary but positive rate. 
Thus, implicitly, some concern for the future effects of 
global warming would be shown, but the extent of this concern 
would depend upon the discount rate chosen. The problem which 
faces economists, falling back on the use of a morally 
unjustified positive rate, is that their policy conclusions 
have serious long term implications. As a result the more 
alert authors are forced to provide footnotes, caveats, and 
qualifications to the effect that some 'compensation' or 
intergenerational transfer may be necessary to correct for 
inequity (see for example Quirk and Terasawa 1991). 
EQUITY AND INJURY 
There is a persistent view that the current generation 
need not be concerned over the loss or injury caused to future 
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generations because they will benefit from advances in 
technology. investments in both man made and natural capital. 
and direct bequests. Adams (1989. p.1274) has raised this 
exact issue in terms of alleviating our responsibilities for 
global warming . While fossil fuel combustion implies foregone 
opportunities for future generations. they "typically benefit 
(in the form of higher material standards of living) from 
current investments in technology, capital stocks, and other 
infrastructure." This line of reasoning confuses actions taken 
for two separate reasons. That future generations may be 
better off has nothing to do with societies consciously 
deciding to compensate the future. That is, the standard or 
basic level of transfers carried out have been intended to 
leave the future better off on grounds of distributional 
justice. Upon realising the potential extent of global warming 
the current generation cannot claim basic or distributional 
transfers were really meant to be compensation for the 
consequences; the harm and loss to be inflicted. 
If society has in fact been undertaking investments with 
the express purpose of compensating future generations for 
global warming the lack of publicity has been conspicuous by 
its absence. More importantly this would imply that the extent 
to which the future will be better off has in some sense been 
balanced against all the long term environmental problems. 
That is, society cannot take global warming and see the future 
as better off, and then ignore global warming and take ozone 
depletion as compensated, and then ignore ozone and balance 
nuclear waste against supposed future well being. Each case of 
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long term damages implies compensation. 
Reducing the stocks of non-renewable resources affects 
future generations in a different manner from the creation of 
long term environmental damages. The concern in the case of 
resource depletion is for the maintenance of basic transfers. 
The concern in the case of environmental damages is for 
reparations for the violation of the right to remain unharmed. 
Those holding the view that the future 1S typically better off 
due to our actions imply that the goal of society has been to 
achieve ever increasing living standards. Thus, there has been 
an intention to improve welfare over time. Compensating 
individuals for the loss and harm they are to suffer has 
nothing to do with this undertaking. 
If all things remain unchanged while non-renewable 
resources are depleted the future will have fewer options. 
That is, for a given technology and capital stock output will 
be lower and environmental degradation higher. ThUS, 
compensation, via improved technology and increased capital 
investment, has been suggested (Barry, 1983). Compensation in 
this context concerns the maintenance of a basic opportunity 
set and is therefore properly regarded as welfare 
distribution. However, there is no particular reason to limit 
compensation for damages to welfare rules being used to 
determine distributional transfers. The appropriate reference 
point for compensation is the level of damages caused to an 
individual. The reference point for distributional transfers 
is the welfare level, difference in welfare, or opportunity 
set of others. 
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Two distinct types of transfer across generations are 
relevant in the context of global warming. First. there is a 
set of basic distributional transfers. which will be defined 
by the ethical rule used in a society. ego Paretian. 
egalitarian. elitist. Basic transfers may be considered as 
achieving the ethically required basic welfare or living 
standard. Second. there are compensatory transfers. which are 
made because injury or loss is inflicted upon a later 
generation by the actions of the current generation. such as 
the combustion of fossil fuels. 
The distinct nature of such compensatory transfers has 
been neglected. This has been partly because they are assumed 
to be identical to basic transfers. and partly due to the 
principle of "potential compensation". If the current 
greenhouse gas emitters could compensate the future climate 
change losers emissions are an improvement regardless of 
whether compensation is actually paid. If compensation were 
undertaken the principle is the Pareto Criterion. 
This leads to an interesting paradox. According to 
Freeman (1986) the Pareto Criterion is neither widely accepted 
by economists nor plays any role in mainstream environmental 
economics. Yet. the basis of cost-benefit analysis is the 
potential compensation principle. which •... is justified on 
ethical grounds by observing that if the gains outweigh the 
losses. it would be possible for the gainers to compensate 
fully the losers with money payments and still themselves be 
better off with the policy·' (Freeman. 1986). Thus. the 
justification for the results of cost-benefit analysis is that 
they are potential Pareto improvements, but Pareto 
improvements themselves are rejected. 
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Thus, use is made of the potential compensation 
principle to deny compensation. The other reason for invoking 
the principle is to separate efficiency and equity. 
Discussions of actual compensation have been avoided on 
grounds that equity issues are outside of the economists 
realm.' The failure to distinguish compensation from basic 
transfers can be seen as a symptom of focusing on the one 
normative concept of efficiency. 
Compensation can be defined as making amends for loss or 
injury; implicitly involving an asymmetry of loss and gain. 
The greenhouse effect as characterised earlier creates an 
asymmetric distribution of losses and gains over time. 
Intergenerational compensation would counterbalance the 
negative outcomes of global warming by positive transfers, 
while not interfering with basic transfers. For example, 
assuming egalitarianism the maintenance of the same welfare 
level fails to compensate for global warming. Yet the 
suggestion has been made that spreading the costs of global 
warming equitably across generations is an acceptable solution 
(Crosson, 1989). 
The stumbling block here is in recognising that 
compensation for injury is a separate moral issue from til" 
concern over distribution. Government transfer payment~ to the 
poor cannot be taken as allowing the government to inflirt 
injury on the poor while claiming the t ran:-;fers a~ 
compensation. Similarly, receiving unprnployrnent benr>fit- is 
un c<Jf.f1l:: ctred to a claim for d a mages when the government is 
[l::',;ponsible for negligence which, for example, paralyses an 
unempl oyed individual. 
LIMITS TO COMPENSATION FOR GLOBAL WARMING 
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The extent to which compensating future generations for 
damage s is acceptable is smaller than might be suggested by 
economists who view changes in units of welfare as equivalent 
regardless of their direction. ' The standard approach of 
economists can be traced at least as far back as Bentham (1843 
p.438) : 
... To the individual in question, an evil is 
reparable, and exactly repaired, when after having 
sustained the evil and received the compensation, it 
would be a matter of indifference whether to receive 
the like evil, coupled with the like compensation, 
or not. 
Unfortunately, this approach treats harm as reversible by 
good. In general, doing harm is not cancelled out by doing 
good. If an individual pays to have a road straightened and 
saves two lives a year, they cannot shoot one motorist a year 
and simply calculate an improvement (Barry, 1983). This 
argument is most apparent where the right to life is involved, 
but can be extended to other areas where rights are accepted 
to exist. For example, assume individuals of a nation are 
accepted to have a right to live in their own homeland. Sea 
level rise due to global warming floods the Maldives and 
violates this right. Of course the Maldavians can be relocated 
and compensated, but this approach is unacceptable given the 
previously stated right. 
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The objection free-market economists might raise to the 
imposition of such rights is that freely contracting parties 
are prevented from entering into agreements of their own free 
will. As Bentham went on to point out: 
What is manifest is --- that to no person, other 
than the individual himself, can it be known 
whether, in this instance, between an evil 
sustained, and a benefit received on account of it, 
any compensation have place or not. 
That is, the individual is their own best judge of welfare 
changes. If the Maldavians believe they are better off in 
their new homeland then who is to deny the acceptability of 
this exchange. The difficulty in the intergenerational cont.ext 
is that the individuals who will be impacted are unavailable 
for comment. In order to protect these individuals from 
unjustified harm rights could be used, so that what appeared 
to be a problem for the use of rights can be viewed as an 
argument in their favour. 
The appeal to the 'safe minimum standard" can be viewed 
as an example of constraining economic trade offs by 
introducing rights. This standard advocates the prot.ection of 
species, habitats, and ecosystems unless the costs of doing so 
are "unacceptably large". In tile case of global warming Aa~ie 
and Shugart (1989) argue that the ~;afe minimum standard wOllld 
support emission reductions despite apparently high costs. 
However, the withdrawal of the right of say a s peci<'s tn pxist 
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at :.;o/Oe cost implies a basis o f the right within utilitarian 
morcdit.y . This view contrasts with rights in the context of a 
deo nt o l ogical philosophy . ' 
Mo re generally. the econo mic process of exchange can be 
viewed a s the tr a nsfer of goods and services within a 
fr a me wo rk of e s tablished right s . In this case rights are only 
valid in as far as the institutional setting allows them to 
exist. This pos i t ion was expounde d by Bentham (for a more 
recent a rgument along these lines see Bromley, 1991). Yet the 
questi o n being probed here is one of the existence of a right 
of future gen e rations in the sense of a natural right, not 
merely the rec ognition by a piece of legislation in a 
parti c ular society that such a right is valid . 
There are many instances where intrinsic human values 
are recognised by "free-market e c onomies" and such rights are 
protec ted from violation by contractual agreement. For 
example. the right to freedom of speech, to freedom from 
torture, to sue another party, to be free from slavery. Freely 
contrac ting children are protected from working in coal mines 
despite the p o tential eco nomic gains. These rights are 
maintained des pite the fact that there are those who would 
accept the los s of their right s given enough money, or 
societies in which these rights are denied. 
The question is, given that they will exist, do future 
generations have inalienable rights? The UN charter of human 
rights represents an internationally accepted set of goals to 
which the world aspires . The fact that these rights are 
violated does not reduce their importance. Yet within these 
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rules there is little comfort for future generations . A 
generous reading would only protect the future indirectly 
under articles intended to protect the current generation. 
Public concern is starting to be expressed regarding this 
oversight and this has reached the extent of a global petition 
to the United Nations. 9 
If rights which protect future individuals from the 
results of our greenhouse gas emissions are accepted to exist 
the scope for trade-offs commonly assumed in economics will be 
drastically reduced. Compensation payments are no longer 
licences for society to pollute, provided the damages created 
are less than the amount of compensation. In which case 
compensation cannot be used to excuse the continuation of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Irreversible damages which will 
occur regardless of greenhouse gas emissions reductions would 
require compensation. In order to protect the future from 
potential infringements upon this right actions with uncertain 
intertemporal consequences would have to be avoided, and 
environmentally benign production and consumption procp.sses 
encouraged. 
Stopping the build up of greenhouse gas emissions in the 
stratosphere is complicated by the delay in transporta t ion. 
That is, concentrations would continue to increase for OVAr 
one hundred years. For example in the cas e of 
chloroflurocarbons total emissi o ns in the world would have to 
be reduced by approximately 85 percent immp.diately in or der" to 
stabilize the concentration of CFC12 (Hoffman 19f16). [lIl A t () 
the cost of enforcing the rigllt s of future generatiorl s to 
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reHI<Jin unharmed the curt"e nt generation has a vested interest 
in denying those rights. Continuing to emit greenhouse gases 
at current rates denies the future the right to remain 
undamag e d and asserts the dominance of the current generation. 
The current g e neration is then being asked to change the 
present rights structure, as found within society, in a manner 
detrime ntal to its own interest. The dictatorship of the 
current generati o n allows the imposition of damages regardless 
of the gain now and the extent of future damages. Yet, the 
abolition of slavery is an example of just such a change 
within society. 
The economists' appeal to cost-benefit analysis attempts 
to take losses and gains of controlling harmful activities 
directly into account. In doing so the rights of future 
generations are violated when the costs of controlling the 
greenhouse effect are deemed to exceed the benefits of that 
control. The use of cost-benefit analysis therefore denies the 
exist e nce of inalienable rights. Reliance upon the potential 
compensation principle prevents compensation while the welfare 
of a subgroup of individuals is reduced. Even the Pareto 
criterion allows harm to be inflicted but at least this harm 
must then be compensated for by resource reallocation. That 
is, harm and good are seen as equivalent. However, harm is 
recognisably different from good and the deliberate infliction 
of harm is morally objectionable. If the right to remain 
unharmed is given to future individuals actual compensation is 
required if these rights are violated. If at all possible 
these rights should not be violated and people should be freed 
from actions which deliberately externalise the risk of 
damages by imposing it upon others. This can be viewed as a 
stricter definition of the Pareto criterion preventing harm 
rather than allowing harm and actual compensation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
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The slippery slope of externalising the harm created by 
our actions can be viewed as having led us to the dramatic 
risks of damages faced by the world under global warming. 
Whether this issue materialises in the devastating form some 
predict or not the moral implications go to the heart of the 
modern industrial society. Immoral actions can be justified if 
society or individuals can potentially (but not actually) 
transfer resources to those harmed. Of course. hopefully the 
consequences of such actions will be felt by those on the 
other side of the world and living in the distant future so 
even the potential need for such considerations can be 
discounted. Restricting the current global warming debate to a 
double-C02 world is endemic of how closed our minds are to the 
potential results of our actions. 
If the current individuals are concerned for the damages 
caused to future individuals the nature of the obligations 
which may exist must be analysed. Those obligations exteno 
beyond potential compensation and even be yond actual 
compensation. Thus. climate change can be viewed as the 
deliberate creation of harm which the current genera t i()fi 
cannot ameliorate with promised welfare increases. This 
implies a much stricter greenholl s e gas r"rjuct inn s prnrJr(Jlfl!"" 
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tha n most of the current economics literature argues is 
ju u tified. The e xa c t degree of strictness will depend upon the 
wa y in which we define o ur obligations to the future. 
Endnotes 
1 . Recognising the potential for such discrimination against 
future generations Quirk and Terasawa do suggest compensation 
f o r any costs impos e d to be a c hieved by "investment set-
asides·. 
2 . The bizarre nature of an individual (or society) holding a 
neg a tive rate of time preference lies in the implication that 
all c onsumption will be delayed until tomorrow. Costs and 
benefits occurring in the future gain more and more weight. 
Thus, even small future damages are likely to be avoided 
completely due to the weight they would have in current terms. 
Yet, some behaviour suggest societies have held negative rates 
ego the Russians under Stalin, and that individuals do hold 
such marginal rates of time preference, see Loewenstein G. and 
Thaler, R. "Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice", Journal of 
Ec onomic Perspectives, 3 , no . 4 (Fall 1989) :181-193. 
3 . These justifications can be found in several sources for 
example Turner, 1988; Attfield, 1983; Kavka, 1978. 
4 . The concept of a vote for all generations might be 
considered from the perspective of the original position 
behind a veil of ignorance, as advanced by John Rawls. 
5. This is much the same problem as an individual faces in 
allocating consumption over their lifetime. 
6. For a contrary view see Page (19B8). 
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7. The standard formulation of objective functions in 
economics makes the relative merits of social states depend 
upon the welfare characteristics of those states. 
Intergenerational efficiency allows for the violation of human 
rights because any two states which generate the same welfare 
values must be treated in exactly the same way. Even if a 
future generation is richer, enjoys a higher welfare level, 
and its marginal utility from a consumption gain is less than 
the marginal welfare loss of the present generation, 
intergenerational transfers may be required to avoid 
uncompensated long term effects of pollution (Sen, 1982). 
B. A deontological philosophy sees certain features in a moral 
act itself as having intrinsic value. This viewpoint contrasts 
with teleological systems which see the ultimate crit~riorl of 
morality in some nonmoral value that results from actions. For 
example, lying is wrong regardless of the consequences. S~e 
Pojman (1989). Neo-classical economist operate with a 
teleological outlook but there may exist a considerahle 1!1Imh"r 
of individuals who hold to deontological philosophies. For 
example the refusal to play and extreme bidrJinq fOllllrl in 
COllt in<jf:nl valuut ion studies may be symptomatic of this. 
~. See "protecting the Rights of Future Generations· Calypso 
LeJ(j August 1991. 
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